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Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Ni, Susu;Zou, Shuliang;Chen, Jiahua
通讯作者:
Ni, S.
作者机构:
[Ni, Susu; Zou, Shuliang] Univ South China, Sch Econ Management & Law, Hengyang 421001, Peoples R China.
[Chen, Jiahua] Hunan Prov Key Lab Emergency Safety Technol & Equ, Hengyang 421001, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
School of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang, China
语种:
英文
关键词:
A spent fuel reprocessing plant;Emotional factors;Insider threats;Nuclear security;RDEU theory
期刊:
Sustainability
ISSN:
2071-1050
年:
2022
卷:
14
期:
4
机构署名:
本校为第一机构
摘要:
The internal threat to nuclear security is one of the most serious problems in the physical protection supervision of spent fuel reprocessing plants. Both insiders and nuclear security departments have obvious characteristics of situational decision making and even irrational decision mak-ing. Combined with Game theory and RDEU theory, the RDEU Game model of insiders and nuclear security departments was constructed to analyze the existence of equilibrium solutions of two-way strategies under different emotional states. From a dynamic point of v...

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