期刊论文

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost

中文

广东工业大学学报

1007-7162

2017

20

3

89-94,105

10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3245

71672074:国家自然科学基金 71501087:国家自然科学基金 14YJCZH168:教育部人文社会科学研究项目 2015JJ3107:湖南省自然科学基金

本校为其他机构

为了分析未来成本对医生与政府监管部门行为演化的影响，本文基于演化博弈理论，构建了考虑未来成本的政府监管部门与医生之间的演化博弈模型。研究发现，在不考虑未来成本的情形下，当政府监管部门的监管收益小于监管成本，且对医生寻租行为的惩罚不足时，系统最终可能演化为医生选择寻租策略的稳定状态；在考虑未来成本的情形下，当医生寻租的未来成本转化为预期损失的系数达到一定水平时，可以在一定程度上遏制医生的寻租行为。因此，政府在制定相应监管与惩罚机制的基础上，还应加强医生流动市场、声誉档案及营业执照的管理，约束医生的行为，保护患者利益。

In order to analyze the influence of future cost on the behaviors of doctor and supervision department, an evolutionary game model between the government supervision department and the doctor is constructed considering future cost. Research shows that, in the case of not considering future cost and the supervision strategy not being chosen because the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit, it may eventually evolve into the stable state of the doctor choosing rent-seeking because of insufficient punishment. When the future cost is consider...