期刊论文

Analysis on the Dynamic Game Between Government Subsidy and Enterprise Behavior in the New-Energy Automobile Industry

中文

中小企业管理与科技(上旬刊)

1673-1069

2018

25

45-46

10.3969/j.issn.1673-1069.2018.25.022

本校为第一机构

在直接补贴政策中,由于政府与企业之间的信息不对称,政府核实企业行为有一定难度且需耗费成本,同时由于企业具有追求利润最大化的动机,企业存在"骗补"行为.论文通过政府补贴与企业行为动态博弈模型的建立,来探究政府补贴在何种情况下才能发挥作用以及如何完善补贴政策.

In the direct subsidypolicy,due tothe information asymmetry between the government andenterprises,it isdifficult and costlyfor the government to verify the behavior of enterprises.At the same time,due to themotive ofmaximizing profits of enterprises,there exists“subsidies deception”in enterprises.Through establishing the dynamic gamemode of government subsidy and enterprise behavior,the paper explores the circumstancesunderwhichgovernment s...